The threat report from The Norwegian Police Security Service
The Department of Justice
Police Security Service
The central unit
PO Box 4773 Nydalen.
0421 OSLO
With reference to the meeting on the 24th of October 2011, and the request for input to the Justice Minister's official statement to the Parliament regarding the terrorist attacks on the 22nd of July.
The Police Security Service (PST) will as well as the police force work to prevent and investigate crimes.
The framework for PST's responsibility is regulated by the Police law § 17 b and includes severe criminal acts which threatens the security of the society and all basic social institutions. In this context, the preventive work must be seen as very important.PST role in the preventative work is regulated bye the law, instructions and procedures. PST are controlled on a strategic level based on annual directives given by the Department of Justice. All priorities are based upon the current / actual threat level. The threat level priorities will be transfered to PST's individual offices which again decides the necessary need for information in each specific case.
1.2 PST's responsibility and duty
Police Security Service
The central unit
PO Box 4773 Nydalen.
0421 OSLO
With reference to the meeting on the 24th of October 2011, and the request for input to the Justice Minister's official statement to the Parliament regarding the terrorist attacks on the 22nd of July.
1. PST's role.
The Police Security Service (PST) will as well as the police force work to prevent and investigate crimes.The framework for PST's responsibility is regulated by the Police law § 17 b and includes severe criminal acts which threatens the security of the society and all basic social institutions. In this context, the preventive work must be seen as very important.PST role in the preventative work is regulated bye the law, instructions and procedures. PST are controlled on a strategic level based on annual directives given by the Department of Justice. All priorities are based upon the current / actual threat level. The threat level priorities will be transfered to PST's individual offices which again decides the necessary need for information in each specific case.
1.2 PST's responsibility and duty
.PST's tasks in preventing crimes are regulated by the legislation in the Police law § 17 b. This responsibility is further described by Or. Proposition. No. 29 (2000-2001) regarding all internal departments. With reference to the duty given from the Ministry on proposition related to sabotage attacks. It appears that in December the Ministry restricted PST's responsibility to not include any damage where private interests were affected.
In order for PST to response according to their responsibility, PST is given permission to process all low threat information internally. The criteria to process this type of information requires a relevance to PST's responsibilities . The Police Law's regulations, PST's internal instructions and procedures decides if the information has any relevance to PST's tasks. These procedures results in a limitation regarding the processing of information, including information regarding any individual's political, religious or philosophical conviction. According to § 15 any further action should be assigned according to the potential level of threat, ability, willingness etc. This means that § 15 results in a 4 month time limit in the process of information, can not continue as the legislation for PST. It's therefore necessary to make main instructions which clarify any relevance to PST's responsibilities. The limitations of § 15 is a result of the surveillance law introduced as early as 1977.
These operations also answers to all international laws set by the human rights conventions, - such as ECHR, and their directives regarding freedom of speech and the legitimacy principles. It is also important to point out that PST should not focus their work on business which are legal according to Norwegian law.
To be able to fulfill PST's tasks in all forms of preventive work it is of great importance for PST to able to work with the public in general. It is also important to exchange information with institutions such as:
The Police
Correctional Services
Customs
Health Care
Immigration
Armed Forces
Other institutions with relevance for Norway
Inrernational partners
In this context it's important for PST to point out the necessarity to cooperate with the leaders of these institutions. It's PST's belief that it's through such cooperation, that PST could eliminate many of the concerns arising towards PST's preventive work.
The work between PST and these institutions are foremost in form of educational work, where the goal is to increase the competence level for the receivers . PST believes that these methods would result in threats being known at an early stage, either by PST or other institutions. PST will be able to,-partly themselves and partly through cooperation, to prevent threats in which PST are set to handle.
A central issue in this kind of work is to avoid all form of suspicion and to build trust among the public. For PST its' therefore important to consider the procedure depending on whether or not it's directed at contra-investigation, contra-terror, contra-extremism or to stop the threat from spreading.
Regarding international work, this consists among other things by monitoring trends seen in other areas of Europe or the world in general. It should be noted that no other partners domestic or internationally, warned PST about any threats coming from any anti jihadic groups.
In addition to information PST get from other institutions and collaborative services, PST has the opportunity to gather information through the use of:
Sources
Contacts
The use of use non-statutory methods
This gathering of information is methods PST are allowed to use both in specific cases or in other forms of preventive actions.
In some cases, PST will receive more qualified information. Should there be reason to investigate someone suspected of preparing a criminal offense in which PST are set to handle, PST will in accordance to the instructions act in a preventive mode.
As part of information retrieval in a case received in 2005, PST got access to a use coercive measures by the use of § 17d in the Police Law . The criteria for using force in preventive cases, is that PST has reasons to investigate if someone is preparing a potentially criminal action in which PST are responsible to handle.
In cases where there are reasons to believe that any potentially criminal act is due to take place soon, PST are instructed to change modus, to stop the criminal act to be executed or focus on investigation. To stop a terrorist attack would be the main goal regarding these matters.
Early prevention of radicalization among young people require dialog and cooperation with other institutions. Raising awareness of radicalization is an important task for PST. Primarily inside PST's own organization, and partly PST's most important partners: the Police Force and Correctional Services. The police council and SLT (coordination of local crime prevention measures) are responsible for the co-ordination to prevent radicalization and violent extremism locally. Through the action plan "public safety-public responsibility" it is made possible for PST to be involved in these cooperations if issues related to PST needs to be handled.
PST received the first information about Global Shield the 22nd of October 2010, as an orientation from the international and joint operational area squad of KRIPOS. In the documents it states it's a joint operation targeting illegal trade in chemicals that can be used in the production of explosives. Global Shield were organized by the WCO (World Customs Organization) with support from Interpol and UNDOC (The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). PST was not the main receiver for the information about Global Shield, but received updates about the project.
This project was operative from the 1st of November 2010 to the 30th of April 2011. PST also received more documents regarding Global Shield after this date . The main issue in this context is a communication from the Customs dated the 3rd of December 2010 involving named Norwegian citizens. In addition it was a list from bank transfers of 41 Norwegian citizens who had transfered money to a bank account in Poland. Anders Behring Breivik was one these 41 Norwegian citizens.
PST did an investigation on the named Norwegian citizens. The result of the investigations gave no reasons to continue further investigations. In no other documents received by PST , is the name Anders Behring Breivik mentioned. The internal evaluation has so far established that the PST has not had any focus on Anders Behring Breivik before 07.22, or other information about him prior to 07.22.
The results of the evaluation should not be predicted. However, PST's priorities should be viewed in the light of their instructions, government directions and the threat level. A further investigation of the information received at the time, was not listed as any priority in PST's instructions . Whether this was the correct priorities, time will tell.
The violent right wing groups in Norway are mainly based on networks and relationships between individuals and groups loosely connected. The contact between the people associated with known extreme right wing groups in Norway, seems primarily to be of a social nature. The need for affiliation and fascination for excitement seems to be the main reasons why young people are recruited to extreme right wing groups , while ideology appear to be a less important factor.
Norwegian violent extreme right wingers hasn't been much active in the past years. The reasons is believed to be an absence of strong leading figures and the lack of organizational ability. Activity in the extreme right wing groups are mainly related to social networks and web sites where ideas, thoughts and ideology are exchanged.
The will to arrange open events and recruiting meetings seems to be low. The social expenses of those who fronts extreme right wing ideologies in public , plus the counter reactions by the leftists who are superior in numbers, seems to be the reason. Socialising and gatherings are however important for the participant's experience and the feeling of belonging in these groups.
In the last two years there has however been a tendency to an increasing activity in the extreme right wing groups in Norway. This activity is primarily visible on the internet. Some groups and individuals have contact with violent criminal organizations. Some individuals also have contact with extreme right wing groups abroad, which are far more violent than the Norwegian groups. This contact may contribute to the radicalization of the community here in Norway.
There is still very few extreme right wing public events . The numbers of violent individuals are low and there's is very little recruitment to these groups. In the extent the extreme right wing communities represent any threat, it's in the form of individual violent behavior.
Although the anti Islamic movements wish to embrace cultural and ethnic breadth, their ideology is based upon a distinct xenophobia. Their ideology is based upon the idea that Europe is about to be islamized and this must be stopped. Especially the European politicians, journalists and intellectuals are being held responsible. There are however few explicit requests for the use of violence and all groups operate within what the freedom of speech allows.
In several European countries anti-Islamic groups represent a growing problem regarding acts of violence. Some European groups are actively seeking confrontations with Muslims and Anti-racists through demonstrations and events. In Norway there has been very few public meetings and demonstrations organized by anti Islamic groups. Groups in Norway are primarily visible in various social networks. In addition to the established groups there are virtual Norwegian and international anti-Islamic groups.
The assessment of how anti-Islamic groups in Norway will affect the national threat level will be presented in a report from PST in the beginning of 2012. So far the only threat seems to be individuals associated with anti-Islamic groups. The established groups reject the use of political motivated violence.
PST has in the aftermath of the terror attacks been concerned about any possible consequences in form of copy cats etc. Spectacular terror attacks which gets a broad media coverage could easily inspire attacks similar or inspired by them. PST's opinion is that there could be a possibility of an individual planning new terror attacks. The terrorist attacks the 22nd of July also points out the challenges associated with discovering people who plans, prepares and execute terrorist attacks alone. Such people could be motivated by different ideological directions, including traditional right wing extremism and anti-Islamic ideas.
5. Solo Terrorism
In order for PST to response according to their responsibility, PST is given permission to process all low threat information internally. The criteria to process this type of information requires a relevance to PST's responsibilities . The Police Law's regulations, PST's internal instructions and procedures decides if the information has any relevance to PST's tasks. These procedures results in a limitation regarding the processing of information, including information regarding any individual's political, religious or philosophical conviction. According to § 15 any further action should be assigned according to the potential level of threat, ability, willingness etc. This means that § 15 results in a 4 month time limit in the process of information, can not continue as the legislation for PST. It's therefore necessary to make main instructions which clarify any relevance to PST's responsibilities. The limitations of § 15 is a result of the surveillance law introduced as early as 1977.
These operations also answers to all international laws set by the human rights conventions, - such as ECHR, and their directives regarding freedom of speech and the legitimacy principles. It is also important to point out that PST should not focus their work on business which are legal according to Norwegian law.
To be able to fulfill PST's tasks in all forms of preventive work it is of great importance for PST to able to work with the public in general. It is also important to exchange information with institutions such as:
The Police
Correctional Services
Customs
Health Care
Immigration
Armed Forces
Other institutions with relevance for Norway
Inrernational partners
In this context it's important for PST to point out the necessarity to cooperate with the leaders of these institutions. It's PST's belief that it's through such cooperation, that PST could eliminate many of the concerns arising towards PST's preventive work.
The work between PST and these institutions are foremost in form of educational work, where the goal is to increase the competence level for the receivers . PST believes that these methods would result in threats being known at an early stage, either by PST or other institutions. PST will be able to,-partly themselves and partly through cooperation, to prevent threats in which PST are set to handle.
A central issue in this kind of work is to avoid all form of suspicion and to build trust among the public. For PST its' therefore important to consider the procedure depending on whether or not it's directed at contra-investigation, contra-terror, contra-extremism or to stop the threat from spreading.
Regarding international work, this consists among other things by monitoring trends seen in other areas of Europe or the world in general. It should be noted that no other partners domestic or internationally, warned PST about any threats coming from any anti jihadic groups.
In addition to information PST get from other institutions and collaborative services, PST has the opportunity to gather information through the use of:
Sources
Contacts
The use of use non-statutory methods
This gathering of information is methods PST are allowed to use both in specific cases or in other forms of preventive actions.
In some cases, PST will receive more qualified information. Should there be reason to investigate someone suspected of preparing a criminal offense in which PST are set to handle, PST will in accordance to the instructions act in a preventive mode.
As part of information retrieval in a case received in 2005, PST got access to a use coercive measures by the use of § 17d in the Police Law . The criteria for using force in preventive cases, is that PST has reasons to investigate if someone is preparing a potentially criminal action in which PST are responsible to handle.
In cases where there are reasons to believe that any potentially criminal act is due to take place soon, PST are instructed to change modus, to stop the criminal act to be executed or focus on investigation. To stop a terrorist attack would be the main goal regarding these matters.
1.3 PST's tasks in preventive crime
PST prevention tasks are directed by the Justice Department in an annual letter. PST goal is to prevent politically motivated crimes and terrorist attacks. In order to carry out this tasks it is necessary to monitor violent radicalized groups in Norway or related to Norway. The prevention means primarily to identify such groups and individuals with the methods and resources PST has available. Especially important when monitoring these groups or individuals is to look for signs which indicate the group or individual has the intention and capacity to commit or support any terror attack . PST relies on working and having dialogs with a broad range of institutions.
After the monitoring and identification phase, the next phase includes the use of actions / tasks and strategy PST uses to prevent such groups or individuals from supporting or to commit any terrorist attacks. Support may include financial, logistical and propaganda activities. It is also a main focus for PST to prevent any recruiting to extremists groups. This includes communication as one of the methods in use.Early prevention of radicalization among young people require dialog and cooperation with other institutions. Raising awareness of radicalization is an important task for PST. Primarily inside PST's own organization, and partly PST's most important partners: the Police Force and Correctional Services. The police council and SLT (coordination of local crime prevention measures) are responsible for the co-ordination to prevent radicalization and violent extremism locally. Through the action plan "public safety-public responsibility" it is made possible for PST to be involved in these cooperations if issues related to PST needs to be handled.
2. Global Shield - the facts
PST cooperation with the project Global Shield and the information PST received from this project has been a critical point after the events of 07.22. It should be noted that Global Shield involves questions in which both PST's internal investigation and the 22 July Commission are currently evaluating. It's therefore not possible to present the final conclusions at the present moment.PST received the first information about Global Shield the 22nd of October 2010, as an orientation from the international and joint operational area squad of KRIPOS. In the documents it states it's a joint operation targeting illegal trade in chemicals that can be used in the production of explosives. Global Shield were organized by the WCO (World Customs Organization) with support from Interpol and UNDOC (The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). PST was not the main receiver for the information about Global Shield, but received updates about the project.
This project was operative from the 1st of November 2010 to the 30th of April 2011. PST also received more documents regarding Global Shield after this date . The main issue in this context is a communication from the Customs dated the 3rd of December 2010 involving named Norwegian citizens. In addition it was a list from bank transfers of 41 Norwegian citizens who had transfered money to a bank account in Poland. Anders Behring Breivik was one these 41 Norwegian citizens.
PST did an investigation on the named Norwegian citizens. The result of the investigations gave no reasons to continue further investigations. In no other documents received by PST , is the name Anders Behring Breivik mentioned. The internal evaluation has so far established that the PST has not had any focus on Anders Behring Breivik before 07.22, or other information about him prior to 07.22.
2.1 Global Shield - preliminary assessments
PST are currently doing an internal evaluation of PST work in the period prior to 07.22. The evaluation will investigate whether PST could or should have done something differently before the terror attacks 07.22, including it's handling of information provided by Global Shield.The results of the evaluation should not be predicted. However, PST's priorities should be viewed in the light of their instructions, government directions and the threat level. A further investigation of the information received at the time, was not listed as any priority in PST's instructions . Whether this was the correct priorities, time will tell.
3. Right wing extremism in Norway today.
PST is responsible to prevent and investigate the use of and incitement to violence among right wing extremist individuals and groups. The following statement is a description of the status of the violent right wing extremists PST are monitoring. The anti Islamic groups is not a part of this and presented in a separate section.The violent right wing groups in Norway are mainly based on networks and relationships between individuals and groups loosely connected. The contact between the people associated with known extreme right wing groups in Norway, seems primarily to be of a social nature. The need for affiliation and fascination for excitement seems to be the main reasons why young people are recruited to extreme right wing groups , while ideology appear to be a less important factor.
Norwegian violent extreme right wingers hasn't been much active in the past years. The reasons is believed to be an absence of strong leading figures and the lack of organizational ability. Activity in the extreme right wing groups are mainly related to social networks and web sites where ideas, thoughts and ideology are exchanged.
The will to arrange open events and recruiting meetings seems to be low. The social expenses of those who fronts extreme right wing ideologies in public , plus the counter reactions by the leftists who are superior in numbers, seems to be the reason. Socialising and gatherings are however important for the participant's experience and the feeling of belonging in these groups.
In the last two years there has however been a tendency to an increasing activity in the extreme right wing groups in Norway. This activity is primarily visible on the internet. Some groups and individuals have contact with violent criminal organizations. Some individuals also have contact with extreme right wing groups abroad, which are far more violent than the Norwegian groups. This contact may contribute to the radicalization of the community here in Norway.
There is still very few extreme right wing public events . The numbers of violent individuals are low and there's is very little recruitment to these groups. In the extent the extreme right wing communities represent any threat, it's in the form of individual violent behavior.
4. Anti-Islamic groups in Norway
Over a period of time an anti Islamic community has appeared in Norway. This must be seen in context of a general growt in anti Islamic movements in several European countries. These groups have a wider and much better recruitment base than the extreme right wing groups, mainly because the members hasn't adopted the traditional extreme right wing symbols and ideologies.Although the anti Islamic movements wish to embrace cultural and ethnic breadth, their ideology is based upon a distinct xenophobia. Their ideology is based upon the idea that Europe is about to be islamized and this must be stopped. Especially the European politicians, journalists and intellectuals are being held responsible. There are however few explicit requests for the use of violence and all groups operate within what the freedom of speech allows.
In several European countries anti-Islamic groups represent a growing problem regarding acts of violence. Some European groups are actively seeking confrontations with Muslims and Anti-racists through demonstrations and events. In Norway there has been very few public meetings and demonstrations organized by anti Islamic groups. Groups in Norway are primarily visible in various social networks. In addition to the established groups there are virtual Norwegian and international anti-Islamic groups.
The assessment of how anti-Islamic groups in Norway will affect the national threat level will be presented in a report from PST in the beginning of 2012. So far the only threat seems to be individuals associated with anti-Islamic groups. The established groups reject the use of political motivated violence.
PST has in the aftermath of the terror attacks been concerned about any possible consequences in form of copy cats etc. Spectacular terror attacks which gets a broad media coverage could easily inspire attacks similar or inspired by them. PST's opinion is that there could be a possibility of an individual planning new terror attacks. The terrorist attacks the 22nd of July also points out the challenges associated with discovering people who plans, prepares and execute terrorist attacks alone. Such people could be motivated by different ideological directions, including traditional right wing extremism and anti-Islamic ideas.
5. Solo Terrorism
Solo Terrorism is used in the PST as a therm - meaning individuals which prepare and possibly intend to carry out a terrorist attack without being part of any movement. A solo terrorist could receive financial support, motivation or support from others, but he/she are alone about all information regarding the attack itself.
Solo Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The term refers to a long tradition in extreme right wing groups among others , where members are been encouraged to carry out attacks on their own. In the last years we have also seen individuals commit acts of violence without being part of any group or larger network
In 2009 and 2010, PST received new information connected to solo terrorism in Europe. The information were based on several high profiled extreme Islamic clerics on Islamic web sites promoting the principles of "no leader resistance" to sympathizers in Europe. At the same time a number of failed attempts to carry out terror attacks took place in several European countries. These attacks made PST form an assessment in 2010 containing the threat solo terrorists represented against Norway and Norwegian interests. This assessment pointed out a number of challenges solo terrorism represent:
• The main challenge is that traditional inputs is missing, such as dialog and communication between members of a group.
• Another challenge is in order to capture a solo terrorist, then many people would probably have to be monitored over a period of time. It is also very difficult to differ between people who only wish to express extremism verbally, and extremist who actually wish to execute a terror attack. All terrorists are extremists, but not all extremists are terrorists.
• A review of previous attacks by solo terrorists shows that in several cases the terrorist had a connection to a former extremist group. Based on these facts, it seems important to focus on people who has been excluded from extremist groups. This again will lead to new challenges regarding todays practice with a 4 month time limit and to increase focus and priority on fewer cases than PST handles at the present moment.
